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This paper explores the means by which warfare influences domestic commodity markets.  It is argued
that England during the French Wars provides an ideal testing ground.  Four categories of explanatory
variables are taken as likely sources of documented changes in English commodity price dis-integration
during this period: weather, trade, policy, and wartime events.  Empirically, increases in price dispersion
are related to all of the above categories.  However, the primary means identified by which warfare
influenced domestic commodity market integration was through international trade linkages and the










  An emerging consensus in the economic history literature has identified the period 
encompassing the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as one of the key turning points in 
the process of global market integration.  Federico and Persson (2007), Jacks (2005, 2006), and 
Studer (2009) all very clearly indict the so-called French Wars in disrupting the slow, but gradual 
process of intra- and inter-continental market integration that had unfolded over the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.  The effects of this commodity market disintegration are most clearly 
seen in the work of O’Rourke (2006, 2007).  The shared findings of his papers are that the 
relative price effects of the French Wars were larger than generally appreciated, global in scale, 
and brought large changes to consumer welfare in their wake.  However, what is less clear from 
all of these studies is the effects of the French Wars on the operation of domestic commodity 
markets. 
  In particular, this paper addresses the questions of how and why England suffered from 
such a decline in domestic market integration.  Locating the sources of this decline is far from 
trivial.  The attendant destruction of commercial and transport infrastructure which typically 
takes place in times of war were notably absent in the English case, due to the accidents of 
geography and history.  In fact, apart from one half-hearted excursion by a mixed lot of French 
soldiers and convicts which was apocryphally repulsed by unarmed Welsh women (Stuart Jones, 
1950), no battles actually took place on British soil.  As a consequence, English commodity 
markets during the French wars make for an analytically simpler—yet still complex—case study 
of the effects of foreign wars on domestic economies. Certainly, there exists a burgeoning 
literature on war and the macroeconomy (cf. Glick and Taylor, 2010; O’Rourke, 2006, 2007).  
However, this paper takes a decidedly different approach by focusing on domestic—rather than 
international—developments in times of war.   
  At the same time, a sizeable literature has put forward favored explanations for market 
disintegration in this period.  Thus, Tooke (1838), Hecksher (1922), Crouzet (1958), and many 
others have all weighed in on this matter.  Yet the specific mechanisms involved remain vague.  
A likely contender in this regard is the effect of the French Wars on the English coastal trade: the 
losses to the mercantile fleet due to French harassment were significant and certainly affected the 
functioning of this crucial link in domestic commerce.  Another contender is the uneven spread 
of commercial banking from its center in London: differing degrees of financial intermediation   2
might imply differences in the provision of commercial credit in times of expansionary 
government policy or shocks emanating from the international economy.  One of this paper’s 
contributions is in sorting out these far from mutually exclusive explanations in a coherent 
empirical framework.  The means for assessing the effects of the French Wars are the prices of 
four basic agricultural commodities—wheat, barley, oats, and beans—at weekly intervals for the 
forty counties of England collected by Brunt and Cannon (2004, 2005).  Standard measures of 
the size of price dispersion across counties are used first to document the dis-integration of the 
English market occasioned by the wars and then to probe the likely channels through which the 
wars affected commodity prices.  The paper offers four such categories: weather, trade, policy, 
and wartime events.  The main conclusions of the paper are that all of the above likely 
contributed to commodity price dispersion but that the primary means identified by which 
warfare influenced domestic commodity market integration was through international trade and 
wartime events. 
  The results of the paper also impinge on key issues relating to welfare and economic 
growth.  First, market integration most immediately impacts the efficacy of markets.  Here, the 
efficacy of markets—as opposed to their efficiency—relates to the level of real resources which 
must be dedicated to the distribution of goods from primary producers to final consumers. 
Considering the considerable number of transactions required to wrangle goods up and down the 
supply chain, any improvement in the efficacy of markets can have profound influences on 
economic welfare (Ejrnæs and Persson, 2006).  In this respect, the French Wars have long been 
implicated in the decline—or at best, stagnation—of standards of living during the early 
industrial revolution period (cf. Ashton, 1949; Lindert and Williamson, 1983; Nicholas and 
Steckel, 1991).  This paper provides further evidence on the disruptive nature of the wars and 
suggests that the process of market disintegration differentially affected English regions, giving 
weight to the view that the French Wars were the primary culprit in depressing real wages during 
this period. 
  Furthermore, the results of this study inform the inquiry into the sources of economic 
growth in general and the industrial revolution in particular.  The role of domestic commodity 
markets in shaping the course of economic history has long been recognized.  In one of the first 
contributions to the literature, Hicks (1969) proposed a market-led growth model, explicitly 
suggesting a role for domestic integration in helping to drive the growth process.  Granger and   3
Elliott (1967) likewise viewed the decline of regional markets and the corresponding rise of a 
truly English market as one of the preconditions of the industrial revolution.  In more recent 
work, Kelly (1997) sought to give teeth to the theory of Smithian growth by demonstrating that 
in a model of geographic specialization with threshold effects in transportation, sustained 
domestic market integration could actually give rise to an abrupt acceleration in the growth rate 
of an economy.  And while his paper focuses on Sung dynasty China as a case study, he does 
note that the same processes could have been at work in eighteenth century Britain with the rise 
of integrated canal and turnpike networks.  Thus, to the extent to which the French Wars 
disrupted English markets, one might expect that changes in domestic integration vitally affected 
the pace of industrialization and growth.   
  The paper proceeds as follows.  After reviewing developments in the transport and 
diplomatic arenas in sections II and III, the paper considers the views of previous researchers on 
the disintegration of English commodity markets in section IV.  Section V discusses the data in 
greater detail while section VI documents the wars’ contribution to the process of market dis-
integration and then seeks to relate changes in the behavior of prices to the underlying processes 
of weather, trade, policy, and wartime events.  Finally, section VII concludes and offers some 
possible implications of the heightened price dispersion brought on by the French Wars for 
English economic history, specifically in the context of the role of commodity markets in 
conditioning English growth prospects for the nineteenth century. 
 
II. Internal Developments: The Primacy of Transport 
For a number of years, Adam Smith's prognosis in 1776 that “the prices of bread and 
butchers’ meat are generally the same, or very roughly the same throughout the greater part of 
the United Kingdom” (1976, p. 177) was taken at face value.
1  Lacking much of the data and 
certainly the necessary statistical techniques, the economic historian’s view of English market 
integration in the eighteenth century was for a long time dominated by the early work of Gras 
(1915) and Rogers (1887, 1902).  The former was quick to point to institutional features in 
explaining the evolution of the English market.  For Gras, the integration of grain markets  
relied on the interplay between municipal corn regulations and the various Corn Laws with the  
                                                           
1 Nor was Smith alone among his contemporaries.  The slightly less esteemed John Arbuthnot 
noted three years before that in English markets it was only necessary to “let corn flow like 
water…it will find its level” (1773, p. 88).   4
eighteenth century marking a somewhat dramatic turning point as the grip of local 
proscriptions—both legal and moral—was lessened.  Although not very explicit on the matter, 
Rogers took a slightly different tack.  Instead, he emphasized the role of well-developed 
transport linkages in driving the process of integration.  At the very least, a cumulative picture 
can be drawn from these two, namely that the gradual integration of various regional markets 
into an approximate national market had certainly taken place by the mid-eighteenth century.   
In one of the earliest, truly quantitative works on the subject, Granger and Elliot (1967) 
find that the emergence of a national market in wheat could be dated from the late seventeenth/ 
early eighteenth centuries.  Admittedly, their data was sparse, but recent and more data-intensive 
work on the late eighteenth century (Shiue and Keller, 2007) as well as the early nineteenth  
century (Jacks, 2005, 2006) suggests that the domestic commodity market in England was 
among the most efficient in the world at this time. Central to this English precociousness was the 
development of internal transport linkages.  This proceeded along many lines in eighteenth 
century England, giving rise to the idea of a transport revolution.  Generally, the literature 
identifies three separate fronts along which this revolution proceeded—canals and rivers, the 
coastal trade, and turnpikes.  In what follows, a brief summary of developments in each sector 
will be provided with the hope of identifying patterns which will be salient to the question of the 
domestic effects of the French wars. 
Of the three, it is canals which have probably captured the popular imagination most 
fully.  Accordingly, a rich literature has developed in British economic history concerning the            
role of canal and river navigation from the earliest of times (cf. Hadfield, 1950-1985; Willan 
1936).  And as a consequence, the general outlines of canal and river development during the 
eighteenth century are readily discerned.  Drawing from its rich natural endowment of rivers, 
England was able to make impressive gains in navigable waterways from the mid-seventeenth 
century when a spate of acts was passed by Parliament.  Duckham (1983) offers a succinct 
summary for our period: from 1660-1750, 40 rivers were subject to Improvement Acts while 
Parliament passed 29 acts for inland navigation in the 1760s, 23 such acts in the 1770s, 
culminating with the Canal Mania of 1790-1794 and its 80 associated inland navigation acts.  
Partly due to the maturation of canal networks, the general atmosphere of austerity, and the fact 
that so many investors had their fingers burned in the speculative boom surrounding the Canal 
Mania, the French Wars saw very few developments in canal or river navigation.     5
  The coastal trade of England and Wales was for long the linchpin in the system of 
domestic commerce.  In 1700, London alone accounted for 69% of all inland trade, with the 
majority of this figure being provided by coastal shipping, especially in coal and grains (Dyos 
and Aldcroft, 1969).  Taking a look at the available figures on shipping capacity, Aldcroft and 
Freeman (1983) report that the tonnage of ships engaged in the coastal trade increased from 
154,640 in 1760 to 332,962 by 1790.  In contrast to the experience with inland navigation, the 
French Wars period seems to be associated with a tremendous increase in coastal tonnage, in that 
it reached 833,416 by 1824.  This view is also corroborated by the figures for the average-per-
annum coastwise shipment of grain which rose from 166,716 tons in the period 1780/86 to 
446,318 tons in 1819/27.  At the same time, the authors notes that “the activity of enemy vessels 
and privateers seriously harassed the shipping of the East and South coast ports” (p. 147; cf. 
Tooke, 1838, p. 115) during the French Wars.  Thus, it remains an open question whether 
additions to the size of the coastal fleet were able to counteract the wartime disruptions. 
  Finally, turning to the rise of turnpikes, we can refer to Arthur Young who noted in 1768 
that “all the sensible people attributed the dearness of their county to the turnpike roads; and 
reason speaks the truth of their opinions…make but a turnpike road though their county and all 
the cheapness vanishes at once” (1768, p. 260).  Certainly then, the perception of turnpikes as 
enhancing market integration—albeit at the cost of diminishing local purchasing power—was 
widely held.  Much of this probably stemmed from the rapidity with which the turnpike trust 
emerged as a dominant means of overland carriage.  A strong surge in the early 1700s which 
established—or more precisely, affirmed—London as the hub of domestic traffic was followed 
by a boom period dating from 1750 which, over the next 20 years, witnessed the formation of 
over 500 trusts operating more than 15,000 miles (Albert, 1983).  1770 marked a fairly dramatic 
break in trend as only 4,000 additional miles of road were added in the next fifty years, most of 
these consisting of feeders to the existing major arteries.  This pattern of establishment, boom, 
and maturation in the physical turnpike network also seems to be matched in its internal 
dynamics.  In a recent series of papers, Bogart traces the impact of turnpike trust formation on 
parish-level transportation investment (2005a) and the consequent reduction in freight charges as 
well as passenger travel times (2005b).  On all accounts, it appears that the big gains in 
investment, freights, and travel times were made prior to 1770 with slow, but steady 
improvements through the French Wars.     6
  To sum up, the early integration of English commodity markets was almost certainly 
dependent upon developments in the transport sector.  And the changes witnessed in canals and 
rivers, the coastal trade, and turnpikes necessarily altered the landscape of English commerce.  
However, for our purposes, it is important to bear in mind that the two overland transport sectors 
were transformed well before the outbreak of the French Wars.  Additionally, the effects of the 
French Wars almost certainly swamped any further developments in the transport sector.  A hint 
of this might be seen in the figures provided by Mathias (1983) who reports that the total 
investment in canals between 1750 and 1815 was some twenty million GBP while the total debt 
issue attributable to the French Wars was some five hundred million GBP and total direct 
military costs were in excess of one billion GBP.  The marginal effects might have been very 
different, but surely the magnitudes involved are telling.  This state of affairs will allow for some 
latitude in the estimation to follow, in that no explicit controls for developments in canals, rivers, 
and turnpikes—beyond county fixed effects—will be thought necessary.  And in the case of the 
coastal trade, the areas affected are conveniently defined by the geography of England.  Before 
proceeding to the empirics, however, a consideration of the main diplomatic developments of the 
period is in order.  
  
III. External Developments: The Primacy of War 
  The state of Anglo-French relations throughout the eighteenth century was contentious at 
best.  In the century before 1793, the two parties openly engaged in warfare for 45 years.  What 
is more, the theatre of conflict was remarkably wide, extending from the traditional epicenter 
provided by the Rhineland and Low Countries to more exotic and far-flung locales such as 
Cochin, Montevideo, and Pittsburgh.  But for all this, the period was marked by a noticeable—if 
somewhat slight—uptake in the level of international trade, both in absolute terms and relative to 
GDP (O’Rourke and Williamson, 2002, 2004).     
These developments, in part, explain why the French Wars can be considered the nadir of 
Anglo-French commercial relations.  The French declaration of war against the English in 
February 1793 witnessed not only the introduction of a revolutionary anti-British rhetoric, but 
also a precipitous decline in Anglo-French trade volumes.  Mokyr and Savin (1976) estimate the 
annual average of Anglo-French bilateral trade in 1793/99 to be one-tenth of the value in 
1788/92.  Although precise figures are harder to come by for the later wartime period of 1800/15,   7
it seems pretty certain that further declines in commercial activity between the two belligerents 
occurred (Cuenca Esteban, 2001).  This decline in trade volumes was, of course, generated by 
enormous increases in trade costs.  Tooke (1838) long ago made this point explicit.  Comparing 
costs between the Baltic and London in 1809/12 and 1837, he found that freight and insurance 
for one quarter of wheat was 600 d. in the former period and 54 d. in the latter.  Likewise, 
Danson (1894) reports that marine insurance premiums in 1816 were less than one-third their 
level in 1810.  One of the most obvious sources for these large premiums was the loss of 
mercantile shipping as even the British with their readily apparent naval superiority lost 11,000 
ships—or equivalently, 2-3% of its shipping stock annually—to privateering over the course of 
the French Wars (Mokyr and Savin, 1976).   
  Coupled with the heightened risks of seizure and sinking, there was also a tremendous 
increase in protective and prohibitive trade measures.  This pattern was firmly established at the 
very outbreak of the war as the Jacobin-dominated French National Convention repudiated the 
unpopular Vergennes—or Eden—Treaty of 1786 and raised formidable tariff barriers.  This was 
followed by a proclamation in October of 1793 which allowed for the seizure of all British goods 
in the realm (Haight, 1941).  The French declaration of war and imposition of trade barriers was 
answered on the other side of the Channel with the first in an almost continuous series of naval 
blockades of the French coast. 
  These acts of commercial aggression were, of course, not limited to the two main 
belligerents.  On the one hand, French and, especially, British treatment of self-declared neutral 
bottoms and crews precipitated major diplomatic crises such as the formation of the League of 
Armed Neutrality in 1800 which saw the Baltic powers—Denmark, Prussia, Russia, and 
Sweden—effectively close the Sound at a time of extreme dearth in the U.K. and major 
commercial crises such as the U.S. Non-Importation Act of 1806/12, the U.S. Embargo Act of 
1807/09, and the U.S. Non-Intercourse Act of 1809/10.  The former crisis was only resolved with 
the destruction of the Danish fleet and consequent shelling of Copenhagen in 1801 (Ruppenthal, 
1943).  And while the latter probably did more harm to the United States than to either of the 
belligerents (cf. Frankel, 1982; Heaton, 1941; and O’Rourke, 2006), it was a decisive factor in 
the American decision to wage the ill-timed—by British standards—War of 1812. 
  On the other hand, the most prominent development of the French Wars was the steady 
annexation of continental Europe into a greater French polity.  In this way, direct political   8
control was established in the Low Countries by 1795; in central Italy, Hannover, and the left 
bank of the Rhine by 1801; in the Piedmont/Liguria by 1804; and in Dalmatia by 1805.  Indirect 
control through the establishment of puppet or vassal governments was in effect by 1804 in the 
Kingdom of Italy; by 1806 in the Confederation of the Rhine and the Kingdom of Naples; and by 
1808 in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and Spain.  Thus, after the successive defeats of Austria in 
1805, Prussia in 1806, and Russia in 1807, Napoleon was in the position to fully extend the range 
of his Berlin Decree of 1806 which banned the import of British goods and prohibited the 
landing of British (including colonial) bottoms in French ports.  This, of course, marked the 
beginning of the Continental System. 
  Economic historians have long debated Napoleon’s exact intentions in declaring his 
reverse blockade of the United Kingdom.  Rose’s claim that his “economic ideas were those of 
the crudest section of the old Mercantilist School” (1902, p. 74) seems to capture much of the 
spirit of early thought on the subject, implying that the goal was simply to bleed Britain of its 
bullion.  Likewise, Cunningham (1910) documents the precipitous decline in the reserves of the 
Bank of England from the beginning of the Continental System to the time of Waterloo.  In one 
of the most authoritative studies on the topic, Heckscher (1922) suggested that the Continental 
System was intended to not only strangle British exports and generate a balance-of-payments 
crisis, but also provide a valuable source of revenue as the war grinded on.  More recently, Neal 
has argued that the Continental System was designed to “disrupt the traditional British 
techniques for financing wars on the European continent” (1990, p. 201).   
Of course, these interpretations are not mutually exclusive.  Indeed, all are consistent 
with one of the most controversial incidents during the French Wars, the exportation in 1810 of 
continental grains following a seriously deficient harvest in Britain.  The amounts imported from 
the continent were far from trivial with 225,710 quarters of grain coming from France and 
1,080,731 quarters coming from allies or vassal states of France (Marshall, 1833).  Various 
commentators (Galpin, 1925; Olson, 1963; and Young, 1812) have calculated these imports to 
represent about 15% of total British consumption, give or take a few percentage points.  
Furthermore, one cannot claim ignorance or indifference on Napoleon’s part as he himself noted 
in 1808 that “the corn question is for sovereigns the most important and delicate of all” (quoted 
in Olson, 1963, p. 61).  Most likely, the decision to grant the licenses simply recognized the 
immense arbitrage profits available for the taking by the revenue-starved French government: an   9
export license for wheat cost 830 francs per ton (Heckscher, 1964) at a time when wheat sold on 
average for some 250 francs per ton in the Pas-de-Calais (Labrousse et al., 1970).  At the same 
time, the decision may have also been motivated by a desire to raise French prices and, thus, 
quell agrarian unrest, particularly in the volatile western regions (Melvin, 1970). 
What all of the preceding hopefully illustrates is that we cannot be as sanguine as 
William Pitt who declared in 1800 that “it is clear from a deduction of facts that war of itself has 
no evident and necessary connection with the dearness of provisions” (quoted in Rose, 1902, p. 
66).  In the following, a brief synopsis of the thoughts of economic historians on the topic will be 
given in an effort to direct the empirical analysis of wartime commodity prices.              
 
IV. Previous Explanations for the Behavior of Commodity Prices 
Fortunately, there are a few leads provided by the economic history of Georgian England.  
In one of the earliest contributions to the literature, Tooke (1838) suggested that of the myriad of 
publications professing to have explained the behavior of English commodity prices during the 
French Wars none had availed themselves to consider the effects of weather on agriculture 
during the period.  His volumes seem to be a catalog of catastrophes, underlining his main point 
that “a greater proportion of unfavourable seasons [took place] in the interval between 1792 and 
1819, than in an equal interval anterior or subsequent to that period” (p. 85).  However, Tooke 
himself was careful to stress the additional—and potentially interactive—effects of the war on 
currency and trade flows.  Some researchers, although acknowledging wartime disruptions, have 
continued to maintain the primacy of the climate in explaining the heightened dispersion of 
prices during the period (cf. Chambers and Mingay, 1966; Lamb, 1977; Libby, 1977; Mathias, 
1983; O’Brien, 1989).  At the same time, the connection between weather and prices has been 
questioned on two fronts.  First, and more generally, some researchers have cast doubt on the 
possibility of isolating the effects of weather on prices, citing the large number of variables 
involved in price formation (Brunner, 2002; Pfister, 1975; de Vries, 1981).  Second, and more 
pointedly, at least one economic historian has claimed that Tooke overestimated the effects of 
weather, suggesting that “it is even possible that he may have assumed bad harvests in certain 
years from the fact that corn prices were high” (Schumpeter, 1938, p. 26).      
In light of the discussion in section III, a second obvious explanation for the behavior of 
commodity prices is the various trade restrictions imposed by the English, French, and other   10
parties.  And nowhere were these restrictions more acutely felt than in the trade in foodstuffs.  
Moving from the position of a net-exporter to a net-importer of grains sometime in the 1760s, 
both English and foreign commentators considered “food…as the weakest link in Britain’s chain 
of defense” (Olson, 1963, p. 6).  Heckscher was even more explicit in noting that “the question 
of the dependence of Great Britain on imports from the European mainland has generally been 
regarded as identical with the question of its provision with food…[and]…the importance of 
Great Britain’s imports of foodstuffs…can practically be regarded as identical with her imports 
of wheat” (1922, p. 336).  This over-reliance on foreign sources of grain was made manifest in 
the years 1795, 1800, and 1812 when adverse trade conditions combined with inclement weather 
to produce widespread bread riots, threats to the person of the King pressing for peace, and the 
highest grain prices ever recorded in England (Fay, 1921; Stern 1964; Thompson, 1971; author’s 
calculations).  Certain authors (Danson, 1894; Galpin, 1925; Sears, 1919) have emphasized the 
degree to which shortages of foreign supply and a certain fetish of self-sufficiency gave rise to 
feverish speculation and, hence, commodity price volatility.
2  On the other hand, even as astute 
an observer as Arthur Young felt “that imports could have only a psychological effect, being too 
small to lower the home price of wheat” (Stern, 1964, p. 180).  A final element to be considered 
with respect to trade issues is the Continental System itself.  More specifically, if it truly was 
successful in inducing balance-of-payments difficulties for England, it would undoubtedly have 
had a profound influence on the course of the exchange rate and, in turn, domestic prices of 
imported goods such as grains.
3    
Another of the predominant themes in the economic history of the French Wars is the 
effects of government military expenditures and borrowing.  The levels of expenditures and 
borrowing were certainly unprecedented with net annual additions to the war debt averaging 
between 5.75 and 6.75% of national income (Williamson, 1985).  The result of this borrowing 
was that the face value of accumulated debt in 1820 stood in excess of £850 million (Clapham, 
1920) with a corresponding market value of £700 million, or roughly two-times GNP (Clark,  
2001).  While most of the literature has focused on the possible effects of crowding-out and its  
                                                           
2 On this point, the recent work of O’Grada (2005, 2007) emphasizes the potential role of 
speculation in alternately exacerbating or ameliorating commodity price volatility in a host of 
settings, depending on the maturity of domestic markets and accompanying institutions. 
3 In addition, the nominal exchange rate, being at least partially determined by English money 
supply, may also reflect changes in monetary policy. See below.   11
implications for British industrialization (cf. Heim and Mirowski, 1987; Temin and Voth, 2005; 
Williamson, 1984; and Wright, 1999), there remain a few avenues which have remained 
unexplored.   
First, research into commodity markets has long emphasized the interaction of arbitrage 
across space and across time, with the interest rate helping to determine the level of storage and, 
thus, the range of commodity prices between periods of production (Samuelson, 1957).  The 
basic idea is that storage behavior is governed by the costs of withholding goods from the market 
until a future date. Apart from the physical deterioration of goods over time and the actual costs 
of storing commodities, the other key variable will be the prevailing rate of interest which 
represents the opportunity cost of not selling in the present, assuming that the proceeds of such a 
sale can and will be invested in alternative assets.  A number of economic historians have 
successfully exploited the behavior of commodity prices to estimate prevailing interest rates (cf. 
Brunt and Cannon, 2004; McCloskey and Nash, 1984; van Zanden, 2004).  Potentially, this 
procedure can be reversed, namely by using data on interest rates to help explain the behavior of 
commodity prices.  The implication is that if the French Wars led to higher interest rates and the 
Samuelson model approximately holds, then the range of intra-annual commodity prices and, 
thus, commodity price dispersion must have increased.   
Second, the suspension of convertibility in 1797 has often been seen as an attempt to 
monetize the debt with disastrous consequences for the dispersion of prices (Acworth, 1925; 
Crouzet, 1958; Silberling, 1919).
4  Monetized government expenditures are likely to register on  
prices on two levels—a general inflationary effect and commodity-specific effects tied to civil or 
military requisitions of foodstuffs and other raw materials, both of which are likely to vary 
geographically depending on the composition of output and the degree of financial 
intermediation at the local level.  Both Schumpeter (1938) and Silberling (1923, 1924a, 1924b) 
explicitly note the positive correlation between the level of expenditure and general—as well as 
commodity-specific—price movements, respectively emphasizing the roles of the proportion of 
borrowing-to-expenditure and advances by the Bank of England.  This also suggests another 
means by which warfare cum monetary expansion provides a link between changes in nominal 
exchange rates and domestic commodity prices of internationally traded goods.   
                                                           
4 For a more nuanced view, see Bordo and White (1991).   12
  Finally, more than a few researchers have suggested a role for wartime events in 
determining the movement of specie prices or equivalently in this era, the nominal exchange rate 
(cf. Crouzet, 1990; Mokyr and Savin, 1976; Neal, 1990; Silberling, 1919).  While some historical 
studies have been conducted on the effects of wartime news on exchange rates, particularly 
during the U.S. Civil War (Guinnane et al., 1996; McCandless, 1996; Weidenmier, 2002), no 
equivalent work has appeared on the effects of “news from the front” on commodity prices.  The 
intuition, in this case, is that the arrival—or accumulation—of news which reflects unfavorably 
on the prospects of victory may initiate new rounds of speculation in commodity markets and 
potentially raise the dispersion of prices.  Thus, the potential explanations for the behavior of 
commodity prices that will be considered below fall into four broad categories: weather, trade, 
policy, and wartime events.  In the following section, a brief motivation for and discussion of the 
dependent and independent variables used will be provided. 
 
V. Data  
  In order to explain the behavior of commodity prices, the first task is to define 
appropriate measures which capture changes in the dispersion of prices.  The commodity price 
data employed is that underlying the recent work of Brunt and Cannon (2004) and described in 
detail in Brunt and Cannon (2005).  The Corn Laws of 1672 stipulated that every market town in 
England and Wales submit weekly returns on the total revenues and quantities sold of corn and 
related commodities.  Using the London Gazette as their primary source, Brunt and Cannon have 
reconstructed the weekly Corn Returns and, hence, prices for barley, beans, oats, and wheat for 
the 52 counties of England and Wales plus London in the period from 1771 to 1820.  In what 
follows, only the data for the 40 English counties will be used as continuous series are not 
available for the Welsh counties and London—the goal being to maintain as strict comparability 
over time as possible.   
Taking a cue from the international macro literature (Engel and Rogers, 1996), the basic 
building block for the analysis will simply be the logged relative price in two counties, 
 ln /
ij
tt PP.  Whereas Engel and Rogers difference this ratio between time t and t-2 and 
calculate its standard deviation, we will take a more intuitive approach.  Recently, Broda and 
Weinstein (2008) have pointed out that this standard deviation term captures “Approximate 
Relative PPP” in that it only measures changes in the percentage deviation of prices in two   13
locations. This property is generated by the fact that Engel and Rogers used city-specific CPIs 
which are only available in index form and not comparable in levels.  Broda and Weinstein 
further suggest that in the case where exact price levels are available a more intuitive measure of 
price dispersion is simply    ln /
ij
tt PP, the absolute value of log of the price of good i in 
location j relative to location k, itself averaged over an appropriate period of time. In what 
follows, we utilize this average price dispersion measure as our dependent variable.  
With the relative price data in hand, the average of the price ratio for two counties was 
calculated for the four commodities, for every calendar year between 1771 and 1815 (t = 45), and 
for all available unique pair-wise combinations of counties (n = 40*39/2 = 780).  Apart from its 
intuitive appeal as a measure of commodity price dispersion, this measure should also serve as a 
good proxy for the level of trade costs separating locations.  Thus, as market dis-integration 
occurs, prices should diverge in the two counties, and one would expect successively higher 
values of this variable.       
Figures 1 through 4 chart the evolution of the preferred measure of commodity price 
dispersion for barley, beans, oats, and wheat, averaging across all unique county-pairs in the 
period from 1771 to 1815.  The results are quite suggestive in that all the series exhibit a marked 
upward swing dating from 1793, the beginning of hostilities. The wheat series, in particular, are 
interesting for the fact that the French Wars came on the backdrop of a downward trend in price 
dispersion throughout the 1770s and 1780s and for the fact that its successive peaks in 1795, 
1800, 1805, and 1812 coincide precisely with the dates identified in the historical literature as the 
years of greatest dearth in England.  If any further doubt remains that the French Wars 
contributed to the relative dis-integration of the English market, Table 1 addresses this issue 
head-on.  There, a simple t-test of the equality of the means in the two periods, 1771-1792 and 
1793-1815, confirms that the French Wars were associated with heightened price dispersion 
across all commodities, save beans.
5 On an unconditional basis, the average increase in price 
dispersion potentially attributable to the French Wars stands on the order of 5%. Of course, what 
remains to be determined is the exact propagation mechanisms.  First, control variables 
                                                           
5 An alternative approach would be to calculate a t-test for the equality of means for every county pair in the sample. 
This exercise was conducted for the case of wheat; the resulting average value was 7.11, further confirming that the 
French Wars period was associated with higher intranational price dispersion.    14
employed in the empirics are introduced.  Then, the four likely suspects—namely, weather, 
trade, policy, and wartime events—and their associated measures will be considered in turn.   
 
Control Variables 
  The control variables employed below are measures of the great-circle distance 
separating counties, their average population densities, as well as a limited set of their 
geographical features, namely their adjacency to one another and whether or not they are situated 
on the coast.  The distance variable is calculated as the logged Euclidian distance between county 
seats and like the other geographic controls is time-invariant.  County area and population 
figures are taken from Mitchell (1988), and the density figure is calculated as the logged average 
of the ratio of population-to-area in counties i and j and varies across county-pairs and time. 
  
Weather 
  The weather variables considered here are the annual means and standard deviations of 
monthly rainfall and temperature taken from the Climatic Research Unit (1992) and Manley 
(1974).  These variables have previously been determined to generate the best fit in semi-
parametric estimations of the harvest-weather relationship by Khatri et al. (1998).  The intuition 
is that the state of the harvest will be a strong determinant of the prevailing dispersion of crop 
prices.  As both deficient or excessive rainfall and temperature will have adverse effects on 
harvests and hence prices, a squared mean term will also be included.  Of course, these variables 
and their interpretation must be treated with some caution as all of the series have been generated 
for one localized area, South-East England, and are, thus, county-pair invariant.  While 
agronomists and historians have long insisted on the importance of micro-climates in agriculture, 
it is likely that the series can at least capture inter-annual variations in English weather, citing 
their usual pattern of high correlation over relatively short distances (Bryson and Padoch, 1981). 
 
Trade 
  English trade figures for wheat, barley, oats, and beans are taken from Marshall (1833).  
The import figures reported there are comparable to those of Mitchell and Deane (1962) and 
Schumpeter (1960).  This source is also attractive in that it allows for the calculation of net   15
imports—that is, imports less exports—for all commodities except beans.
6  Another trade-related 
variable to be considered is the exchange rate for the GBP.  Lacking a truly appropriate reference 
currency, the decision was made to use the GBP-USD exchange rate in light of both the relative 
isolation of the United States from the events of the French Wars and its burgeoning importance 
in the English overseas grain trade.  Annual means and standard deviations were computed from 
the monthly U.S. series given in Schneider et al. (1991). Both the trade and exchange rate data 
variables are county-pair invariant. 
 
Policy 
  In assessing the effects of changes in interest rates induced by government expenditures, 
monthly price data on 3% Consols underlying Neal (1990) are used to construct annual means 
and standard deviations.  The choice of the price of Consols is straightforward: these were the 
primary vehicle for financing the war effort; and since they were zero-coupon bonds, their price 
should accurately capture changes in the market rate of interest.  The second class of variables 
are those relating to monetary and fiscal disbursements.  The particular variables of interest are 
the means and standard deviations of Silberling’s quarterly series on Bank of England total 
advances (1923) and the values of Schumpeter’s annual series on the level and composition of 
the English national debt (1938), specifically the ratios of unfunded-to-total debt and revenue-to-
expenses. In both cases, the variables under this category are county-pair invariant. 
 
Wartime Events 
  Here, it is proposed that there are at least three variables which might have altered market 
perceptions of the progress of the war and fed into the behavior of prices via speculation in 
commodity markets.  These are the levels of British and allied casualties in battle; the average 
duration of battles; and the average rate of strategic loss in battle of the British and their allies.  
All of these were calculated annually using Smith (1998).  In order to ease the data entry 
requirements, only incidents with 1000+ casualties on either side were coded.  In total, over 350 
incidents attained this threshold. Once again, the variables under this category are county-pair 
invariant. 
 
                                                           
6 These were apparently exported only very rarely, in any case.   16
Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for all dependent and independent variables used 
below while Table 3 reproduces the correlation matrix for all independent variables.  
 
VI. Empirics  
Initial Exercises 
The basic specification in this section is of the following form: 




t Adjacency Density Dist Dispersion Dispersion , 3 , , 2 , 1
,
1
, ) ln( ) ln(           
t j i j o i o j i Coast , , , , , 4         , 
where Dispersion is defined as before as the average of logged relative prices in two counties in 
a given calendar year and is assumed to follow an autoregressive process.  The estimates are 
corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and any remaining auto-correlation, suggesting that 
OLS will be consistent.  Additionally, standard errors are clustered on years to account for the 
fact that many of our independent variables are county-pair invariant and, thus, their standard 
errors may be downwardly biased if left uncorrected.  The Dist term is the Euclidean distance 
separating the county seats of i and j; the expectation is that dispersion should be increasing in 
this variable.  Density is the logged average population density of counties i and j.  In this case, it 
might be reasonable to expect either positive or negative effects.  If we take a cue from the 
literature on the gravity model of trade, it is generally found that trade flows between nations are 
increasing in the density of populations as this proxies for the thickness of markets.  In this light, 
Dispersion would be negatively correlated with Density, that is, trade flows work to ameliorate 
commodity price dispersion.  At the same time, Density could capture diseconomies of scale in 
marketing or congestion costs in transportation, resulting in a positive correlation with 
Dispersion.  Finally, the specification above includes a number of indicator variables: Adjacency 
for whether counties i and j lay next to each other to capture potential changes in administrative 
boundaries or transportation modes associated with crossing county borders; Coast for whether 
counties i and j both lay on the coast to capture the possibility of coastal shipping linking the 
two; and fixed effects for each county. 
  Benchmark estimates for wheat in the period from 1793 to 1815 can be found in Panel A 
of Table 4.  The coefficients conform to the priors given above: commodity price dispersion is 
strongly persistent from year to year, increasing in distance, and decreasing in adjacency.  To   17
give some sense of the magnitudes involved, a one standard deviation increase in logged distance 
(=0.635) is predicted to increase the price dispersion measure by 0.198 standard deviations 
(=0.028).  Equivalently, adjacency is predicted to lower dispersion by 0.082 standard deviations 
and coastal counties are predicted to have dispersion which is 0.108 standard deviations higher.  
This last result on the Coast variable may seem paradoxical as we would generally associate 
maritime transport with lower trade costs and, hence, commodity price dispersion.  However, as 
can be seen in the Appendix, this result is contingent upon the state of warfare.  Finally, this 
specification captures an appreciable amount of the variation of the dependent variable, in that 
the R
2 is a healthy 0.330.
7   
  Panels B, C, and D of Table 4 consider the other commodities available from the London 
Gazette, namely barley, beans, and oats.  In general, the results are encouraging.  In all four 
commodity classes, commodity price dispersion is positively serially correlated, increasing in 
distance, and smaller in the presence of a shared county border.  In the case of oats, however, 
there are no identifiable effects for coastal locations.  This apparently reflects the fact that this 
commodity with its low unit-value was not traded as extensively as wheat with the consequence 
that most flows of oats were highly localized (Gras, 1915; Rogers, 1902).  In what follows, the 
focus will be concentrated on the results for wheat.  This choice reflects a desire to keep the 
exposition cleaner and the notion that the market for wheat best approximates general conditions 
in the national market for commodities. Additionally, the interested reader can also consult the 




Table 5 reports the OLS estimates with the full set of independent variables and county 
fixed effects.  Generally, the results look reasonable.  All the control variables—save the Density 
variable—retain roughly the same coefficients as in Panel A of Table 4.  The percentage of the 
variation in average price dispersion explained by the independent variables is also high with an 
                                                           
7 In a specification without county fixed effects, the R
2 drops to 0.299, suggesting that our 
control variables—and not the county fixed effects—are doing most of the heavy lifting here. 
Most of the explanatory power, however, is still in the cross-section as all the control variables 
save one are time-invariant.  It is only the density variable which has any time-varying 
component, but this is relatively muted as it follows a smooth upward trend and is not punctuated 
by the spikes seen in Figure 4.    18
R-squared value of 0.870.  In terms of the two weather variables, rainfall and temperature, there 
is evidence of a non-linear relationship, as the average and squared-average terms are both 
significant.  Both suggest that increases in average monthly rainfalls and temperatures—when 
evaluated at their means—were associated with better harvests, and, thus, lower price 
dispersion.
8  Additionally, the standard deviation of rainfall is found to be positively associated 
with commodity price dispersion. 
  Turning to the results on the trade variables, here, we find commodity price dispersion to 
be decreasing in net imports, but with a rather strong and positive coefficient on the squared 
term.
9  In theory, net imports could be positively or negatively associated with commodity price 
dispersion: positively if unsettled market conditions—that is, higher price dispersion—induced a 
flow of imports into England; and negatively as the flow of imports could stabilize price 
dispersion by augmenting domestic commodity stocks.
10  Additionally, the table shows that 
commodity price dispersion was decreasing in the level of the GBP exchange rate.  This can be 
thought of in two ways, either as the greater purchasing power of the GBP or the lack of balance-
of-payment difficulties facilitating international transactions for grain.  In any case, the most 
important evidence comes from the standard deviation of the exchange rate.  Any reasonable 
prior would suggest that commodity price dispersion would be increasing in exchange rate 
volatility, a result confirmed in the data.   
  On the fiscal and monetary policy variables, we find that the average Consol price is 
negatively associated with commodity price dispersion.  This makes intuitive sense as the Consol 
is a zero-coupon bond, and its price should be negatively correlated with the market interest rate.  
                                                           
8 This result is masked by the positive coefficient on average monthly rainfall.  However, given 
the coefficient values, the inflection point is actually 67.4—that is, commodity price dispersion is 
predicted to fall at all levels of rainfall greater than 67.4 centimeters.  This can be compared to 
the mean and minimum values of 78.56 and 63.70, respectively. 
9 An increase in imports at its mean value of 0.545 would imply that price dispersion was 
virtually unchanged. The regression coefficients imply that the effect of imports is upwardly 
convex with a minimum at 0.462. That is, increases in imports from levels below the mean serve 
to decrease price dispersion while increases of imports from levels above the mean are associated 
with higher price dispersion. 
10 Of course, as the discussion above suggests, there is a strong potential for endogeneity 
between price dispersion and the flow of imports and, thus, biased estimates in such a 
specification.  Unfortunately, instrumenting imports with declarations of French naval blockades 
and British shipping losses returned grossly imprecise estimates.  The author thanks the editor 
for highlighting this point.   19
Thus, Table 5 provides evidence that commodity price dispersion is positively related with the 
level of the nominal interest rate.  The results also suggest that dispersion is decreasing in the 
level of Bank of England (BOE) advances and increasing in this variable’s standard deviation.  
Interpreting the second result is straightforward as the volatility of money stocks is often taken as 
a proxy for uncertainty over future rates of inflation (Devereux and Yetman, 2005).  Interpreting 
the first result seems more problematic, especially if we expect BOE advances to reflect the 
general rate of inflation.  In this case, it is important to remember that we are already 
conditioning on two other variables—the ratios of unfunded-to-total debt and of revenue-to-
expenses which are likely to capture any monetization of debt on the part of the British 
government and which perform as expected with commodity price dispersion increasing in the 
former and decreasing in the latter.  It is argued that in this case the level of BOE advances 
captures the ease of obtaining commercial credit and, thus, the facilitation of both domestic and 
international trade flows (Acworth, 1925).  The last independent variables to consider are those 
relating to wartime events.  All three variables—the annual allied causalities, the average 
duration of battles and the rate of strategic loss in battle—contribute significantly to the 
explanatory power of the regression in column A and enter into the estimates with the expected 
signs.    
 
Assessment of Wartime Forces 
  The final exercise in this section will be to provide a rough assessment of the relative 
magnitude of the wartime forces in effect under the general headings of weather, trade, policy, 
and wartime events.  However, we are immediately confronted with the fact that the set of 
independent variables is not only large but also may suffer from relatively high degrees of 
correlation within groups as seen in Table 3.  An obvious way forward is to employ factor 
analysis to reduce the dimensionality of our independent variables.  Factor analysis has a long-
standing tradition in the psychometrics literature dating from at least the work of Spearman 
(1904) and is becoming increasingly common-place in finance and macroeconomics. The 
intuition is much like that of OLS regression: in a multi-dimensional space, factor analysis seeks 
to identify successive hyper-planes (or factors) which capture increasing amounts of the shared 
variation in the underlying variables. Once the most relevant factors are identified, it then   20
becomes possible to extract a single index thought to be representative of the variation in the 
underlying data. 
  Table 6 reports the results of factor analysis on our four categories of independent 
variables: weather, trade, policy, and wartime events.  The shared outcome is that a very high 
degree of the variation within these headings can be accounted for by a relatively small number 
of factors in each case. Log-likelihood ratio tests also confirm the significance of the factors 
under each heading. With these results in hand, it is then possible to collapse the independent 
variables under each heading into a single factor score (or composite variable). These four factor 
scores simply replace the long list of variables in the estimating equation for Table 5.  Table 7 
largely reproduces the results found there with respect to the control variables, albeit at a cost of 
a slightly smaller R-squared and slightly larger root mean-squared-error. Unfortunately, the 
relatively high correlation between the weather and trade indices on the one hand and the 
government policy and wartime events indices on the other seems to confound precise estimation 
for the weather and policy indices.  
  Regardless of the indices’ statistical significance, we can rank the indices in terms of 
their quantitative significance.  In the case of a one standard deviation increase in the weather 
index (=0.998), commodity price dispersion is predicted to change by 0.069 standard deviations. 
Likewise, trade, government policy, and wartime events are predicted to change commodity 
price dispersion by 0.157, 0.062, and 0.132 standard deviations, respectively.  Given these 
figures along with those on statistical significance, the results suggest that the prime movers of 




The purpose of this paper has been in determining the means by which warfare influences 
the process of domestic commodity market dis-integration.  It was argued that England during 
the French Wars was an appropriate choice, given the prominent role of commodity markets in 
English economic history, the rich set of data available, and the accidents of geography and 
history which made for a clean analytic case study—that is, the English experience allows one to 
abstract away from the physical destruction generally associated with wars.  Following the lead 
of earlier economic historians, four categories were suggested as likely sources of changes in the   21
degree of commodity market integration, namely weather, trade, policy, and wartime events.  
The means of assessing the various explanatory variables were empirical exercises relating 
commodity price dispersion to likely proxies for the four categories.  Overall, it is suggested that 
the primary vehicle for warfare to influence domestic commodity market integration was through 
international trade linkages and the arrival of news regarding wartime events. 
Apart from highlighting this empirical finding, we might do well to consider the broader 
implications of this study.  For one, it might inform the terms of an emerging debate on the 
relation between well-functioning markets and economic growth.  A recent literature has 
emerged concerning the relative performance of markets and the determinants of economic 
growth in the time of the Industrial Revolution, echoing in part the market-led growth model 
proposed by Hicks (1969).  The most prominent of these studies is the work of Shiue and Keller 
(2007) which finds a statistical dead-heat between Western Europe and China in terms of 
commodity market integration prior to 1780, but a real English lead among all the contenders.  
Their conclusion seems to be a negative one, in the sense that the simultaneous occurrence of 
sustained economic growth and an upswing in commodity market integration in Western Europe, 
circa 1830, suggests to them that the latter is not a necessary condition for the former. In this 
view, there seems to be little room for markets in explaining the nature or timing of the European 
ascent to economic primacy in the nineteenth century. However, if the smooth functioning of 
markets matters at all, then the fallout of the French Wars on the English domestic economy 
could have profound implications for our understanding of the nature and timing of economic 
growth.  
What will be suggested in closing is a defense of well-functioning markets in 
conditioning future growth prospects.  Of course, this notion is not a new one to readers of 
economic history.  North and a series of co-authors has long argued that the particular 
constellation of English institutions —inclusive of its markets—was the key to its burgeoning 
economic success in the eighteenth century (North and Thomas, 1973; North and Weingast, 
1989).  Likewise, Acemoglu et al. (2005) have recently reminded us that the interactive effects 
between markets, institutions, and growth can take a very long time to unfold.  At the same time, 
relatively little has been made of the role of domestic—as opposed to international—markets in 
determining English output growth.  Given the predominance of domestic trade at the time and 
the disruptions of domestic markets attendant upon the French Wars, the degree to which the   22
domestic market got prices right could have been crucial to England’s growth prospects at the 
time.  In a sense, this work follows up on the sentiments of Adam Smith who felt that the causes 
of English prosperity seem to be the “equal and impartial administration of justice” along with 
“the liberty of exporting…to almost any foreign country and what perhaps is of still greater 
importance, the unbounded liberty of transporting [goods] from any part of our own country to 
any other…” (1976, p. 610).  Of course, more fully explicating the causal links between growth, 
institutions, and markets—both domestic and international—in the English case remains a task 
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Appendix 
Having considered the cross-commodity properties of the control estimation, here we will 
take a look at the temporal stability of the estimates to ensure that these are not simply generated 
by wartime conditions.  Panel A of Table A1 reports the results for the non-wartime period from 
1771 to 1792 while Panel B repeats the results for the period from 1793 to 1815 for ease of 
comparison.  Naturally, the English saw their fair share of warfare during the period from 1771 
to 1792, including—but not limited to—the American Revolutionary, Anglo-Mysore, and 
Anglo-Maratha Wars. The argument here is that these conflicts were on the whole periphery—as 
their names would imply—and minimally disrupted the traditional financial and trade flows of 
the English.  All the coefficients are estimated to be of the same sign and, generally, of the same 
magnitude before as opposed to during the French Wars.   
However, there is one exception.  The coefficient on Coast is strongly insignificant 
before the wars, suggesting that coastal counties were no better off on average in times of peace.  
However, the coefficient on Coast is positive and strongly significant during the wars.  This can 
be explained by two observations.  First, although we condition on distance, this is a linear 
measure while most coastal routes would have been decidedly non-linear—here, a good example 
might be Lancashire and Lincoln which has a measured distance of 117 kilometers, but which 
would be separated by some 1500 kilometers of coast.  In other words, the Coast variable may be 
too coarse to capture any advantages enjoyed by a very small subset of coastal counties, 
explaining its insignificance in the pre-war years.  At the same time, the harassment of coastal 
shipping during the French Wars is likely to have driven freight and insurance costs up enough 
for this subset to register in the data, explaining its significance in the war years.   
This result can be seen a little more clearly if we control for geographical variation in the 
Coast variable by constructing separate indicators for the east, west, and south coasts of England.  
The results from including these indicators in the regressions for during the war are presented in 
Panel C of Table A1.  For the wartime estimation, we still pick up the positive Coast effect, but it 
is clearly limited to the southern coast of England—precisely the area which contemporaries and 
historians have identified as being the most susceptible to French raiding parties (Aldcroft and 
Freeman, 1983; Mokyr and Savin, 1976).  On the other hand, the littoral counties of the North 
Seas in particular were largely protected, as their conditional mean is predicted to be 0.014 (or 
over 15%) lower than that of the full sample (0.094). 
Finally, there is the potential that the estimation strategy is not fully controlling for cross-
sectional correlation in the error terms.  The intuition here is that by using price data for all 
county-pairs the standard errors on the regression coefficients may be biased downward as the 
relative prices in certain county-pairs may not be independent of those in a second county-pair.  
For example, we include price information on the county-pairs of Lancashire-Lincolnshire, 
Lancashire-Yorkshire, and Lincolnshire-Yorkshire when it may be econometrically sufficient to 
consider only the first two pairs, as the third pair might provide no more independent 
information.  A potential corrective is to estimate equation 1.) above but only on a subset of 
county-pairs.  What is needed in this case is an appropriate reference point.  This is not a difficult 
task, as Defoe writing in the 1720s noted that “this whole Kingdom, as well the people, as the 
land, and even the sea, in every part of it, are employed to furnish something…to supply the city 
of London with provisions” (1991, p. 12) and that, above all, London corn was “provided in all 
counties of England” (Ibid., p. 397).  Accordingly, in Panel A of Table A2, the estimation results 
are reported for only those county-pairs which include Middlesex.  Middlesex was chosen as the 
numéraire as price data for London is only available for the period from 1771 to 1793.  However,   29
given that the correlation between the two series for that period is 0.94, the substitution of 
Middlesex seems justified.  In general, these match the general patterns and magnitudes of Panel 
B, the full-sample results.  The only deviation is the insignificance on the Coast variable in Panel 
A.  However, in this specification, this is not strictly speaking the same variable as in Panel B, in 
that Middlesex is not a coastal county—that is, Coast is no longer bilaterally defined, but rather 
enters as a one when the other county in the pair is on the coast.  In sum, the results suggest that 
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Dependent variable: average price dispersion
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
Wheat, 1771-1792, with county fixed effects Wheat, 1793-1815, with county fixed effects Wheat, 1793-1815, with county fixed effects
Coefficient Std. Err. p-value Coefficient Std. Err. p-value Coefficient Std. Err. p-value
Lagged value 0.409570 0.052831 0.00 Lagged value 0.402456 0.068298 0.00 Lagged value 0.390818 0.068870 0.00
Distance 0.012350 0.002454 0.00 Distance 0.015580 0.003084 0.00 Distance 0.013831 0.002957 0.00
Density -0.019447 0.030499 0.53 Density -0.018939 0.028654 0.52 Density -0.019391 0.028671 0.51
Adjacency -0.005130 0.001189 0.00 Adjacency -0.004134 0.001222 0.00 Adjacency -0.004986 0.001255 0.00
Coast 0.000711 0.001854 0.71 Coast 0.005440 0.002191 0.02 Coast 0.009906 0.002628 0.00
East coast -0.024299 0.007492 0.01
West coast -0.009474 0.004711 0.06
South coast -0.003005 0.003705 0.43
NNN
R-squared R-squared R-squared
Root MSE Root MSE Root MSE
NB: Fixed effects suppressed; OLS estimation with heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation consistent
     standard errors clustered on years.

































Dependent variable: average price dispersion
Panel A: Panel B:
Wheat, 1793-1815, with county fixed effects Wheat, 1793-1815, with county fixed effects
County-pairs including Middlesex county only All county-pairs
Coefficient Std. Err. p-value Coefficient Std. Err. p-value
Lagged value 0.113108 0.068304 0.01 Lagged value 0.402456 0.068298 0.00
Distance 0.006838 0.002454 0.01 Distance 0.015580 0.003084 0.00
Density -0.031784 0.024481 0.21 Density -0.018939 0.028654 0.52
Adjacency -0.009723 0.005064 0.07 Adjacency -0.004134 0.001222 0.00
Coast -0.001219 0.010399 0.91 Coast 0.005440 0.002191 0.02
NN
R-squared R-squared
Root MSE Root MSE
NB: Fixed effects suppressed; OLS estimation with heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation consistent
     standard errors clustered on years.
0.031
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Barley Beans Oats Wheat
1771-1792 Mean 0.1232 0.1548 0.1299 0.0915
Variance 0.0044 0.0085 0.0059 0.0026
Observations 17160 14528 17159 17160
1793-1815 Mean 0.1324 0.1557 0.1425 0.0943
Variance 0.0055 0.0091 0.0070 0.0025
Observations 15600 11808 15539 15600
Value of t-test for
equality of means: 11.84 0.74 14.12 4.85










Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Average price dispersion (wheat only) 14820 0.094 0.050 0.012 0.378
Distance 14820 5.108 0.635 1.282 6.372
Density 14820 -1.785 0.640 -2.804 1.000
Adjacency 14820 0.119 0.324 0.000 1.000
Coast 14820 0.244 0.429 0.000 1.000
Average monthly rainfall (centimeters) 14820 78.56 7.49 63.70 91.12
Average rainfall, squared 14820 6227.59 1170.73 4057.69 8302.85
Rainfall, standard deviation 14820 36.92 8.07 18.50 47.67
Average monthly temperature (degrees Fahrenheit) 14820 48.13 1.05 45.95 49.80
Average temperature, squared 14820 2317.59 100.84 2111.40 2480.24
Temperature, standard deviation 14820 5.231 0.482 4.500 6.320
Net imports, millions of quarters 14820 0.545 0.419 0.004 1.455
Net imports, squared 14820 0.473 0.649 0.000 2.117
Average annual exchange rate  14820 100.86 6.58 84.58 109.49
Exchange rate, standard deviation 14820 2.088 1.102 0.838 5.008
Average monthly Consol price 14820 61.97 4.94 50.69 68.45
Average quarterly BOE advances 14820 25.32 10.49 10.50 42.93
BOE advances, standard deviation 14820 1.306 0.787 0.310 3.180
Ratio of unfunded-to-total debt 14820 4.939 1.470 1.721 7.355
Ratio of revenue-to-expenses 14820 0.681 0.149 0.350 0.880
Annual allied casualties (1000s) 14820 50.64 45.82 3.40 153.17
Average duration of battles 14820 12.20 11.78 1.00 36.50
Rate of strategic loss in battle 14820 0.521 0.197 0.000 0.860
Table 2: Summary Statistics  36
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
(1) Distance 1.00
(2) Density -0.12 1.00
(3) Adjacency -0.58 0.03 1.00
(4) Coast 0.28 -0.15 0.01 1.00
(5) Average monthly rainfall (centimeters) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
(6) Average rainfall, squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
(7) Rainfall, standard deviation 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.43 1.00
(8) Average monthly temperature (degrees Fahrenheit) 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 0.11 1.00
(9) Average temperature, squared 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 0.11 1.00 1.00
(10) Temperature, standard deviation 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.19 -0.21 0.08 -0.10 -0.11 1.00
(11) Net imports, millions of quarters 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.14 -0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.02 1.00
(12) Net imports, squared 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 0.10 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.92 1.00
(13) Average annual exchange rate  0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 -0.16 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.03 0.03 1.00
(14) Exchange rate, standard deviation 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.18 -0.33 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.32 1.00
(15) Average monthly Consol price 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.13 -0.13 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.10 1.00
(16) Average quarterly BOE advances 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.34 -0.39 -0.39 -0.25 -0.03 0.00 -0.41 0.46 0.20 1.00
(17) BOE advances, standard deviation 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.30 -0.29 -0.52 -0.28 -0.28 -0.24 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.21 0.50 1.00
(18) Ratio of unfunded-to-total debt 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.24 0.03 -0.32 -0.32 0.12 -0.06 -0.01 -0.27 0.34 0.51 0.67 0.10 1.00
(19) Ratio of revenue-to-expenses 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.15 -0.27 -0.18 -0.17 -0.28 -0.10 -0.05 0.14 0.07 0.38 0.60 0.41 0.52 1.00
(20) Annual allied casualties (1000s) 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.18 -0.32 -0.32 -0.27 0.02 -0.01 -0.54 0.29 0.08 0.39 -0.24 0.45 0.07 1.00
(21) Average duration of battles 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.19 -0.23 -0.24 0.30 -0.04 -0.02 -0.41 0.24 0.25 0.28 -0.13 0.51 -0.06 0.23 1.00




Table 3: Correlation Matrix  37
Dependent variable: average price dispersion
Panel A: Panel B:
Wheat, 1793-1815, with county fixed effects Barley, 1793-1815, with county fixed effects
Coefficient Std. Err. p-value Coefficient Std. Err. p-value
Lagged value 0.402456 0.068298 0.00 Lagged value 0.343950 0.069875 0.00
Distance 0.015580 0.003084 0.00 Distance 0.024820 0.003904 0.00
Density -0.018939 0.028654 0.52 Density -0.063345 0.046431 0.19
Adjacency -0.004134 0.001222 0.00 Adjacency -0.004265 0.001613 0.02
Coast 0.005440 0.002191 0.02 Coast 0.009424 0.003688 0.02
NN
R-squared R-squared
Root MSE Root MSE
Panel C: Panel D:
Beans, 1793-1815, with county fixed effects Oats, 1793-1815, with county fixed effects
Coefficient Std. Err. p-value Coefficient Std. Err. p-value
Lagged value 0.410292 0.066774 0.00 Lagged value 0.463338 0.067399 0.00
Distance 0.028128 0.005646 0.00 Distance 0.005874 0.002485 0.03
Density -0.064685 0.055146 0.26 Density 0.003935 0.039005 0.92
Adjacency -0.005087 0.002166 0.03 Adjacency -0.017064 0.003316 0.00
Coast 0.009288 0.004589 0.06 Coast 0.000886 0.004142 0.83
NN
R-squared R-squared
Root MSE Root MSE
NB: Fixed effects suppressed; OLS estimation with heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation consistent
     standard errors clustered on years.
0.330 0.334
0.041 0.060




11180 14760  38
Dependent variable: average price dispersion
Coefficient Std. Err. p-value
Lagged value 0.409311 0.061051 0.00
Distance 0.015672 0.002988 0.00
Density 0.021943 0.007723 0.01
Adjacency -0.003639 0.001135 0.01
Coast 0.005545 0.002214 0.02
Average monthly rainfall (centimeters) 0.006334 0.002298 0.01
Average rainfall, squared -0.000047 0.000016 0.01
Rainfall, standard deviation 0.000914 0.000011 0.00
Average monthly temperature (degrees Fahrenheit) -0.072360 0.015121 0.00
Average temperature, squared 0.004581 0.000792 0.00
Temperature, standard deviation -0.001167 0.001238 0.36
Net imports, millions of quarters -0.055145 0.009407 0.00
Net imports, squared 0.059694 0.006950 0.00
Average annual exchange rate  -0.000771 0.000207 0.00
Exchange rate, standard deviation 0.013939 0.001038 0.00
Average monthly Consol price -0.001793 0.000168 0.00
Average quarterly BOE advances -0.005586 0.000778 0.00
BOE advances, standard deviation 0.018301 0.001653 0.00
Ratio of unfunded-to-total debt 0.009485 0.000281 0.00
Ratio of revenue-to-expenses -0.060845 0.004014 0.00
Annual allied casualties (1000s) 0.000080 0.000016 0.00
Average duration of battles 0.000150 0.000064 0.03




NB: Fixed effects suppressed; OLS estimation with heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation
     consistent standard errors clustered on years.




Country fixed effects  39
 
Method: principal factors
Weather; N=14820; retained factors=4
Percentage of variation  Cumulative variation
Eigenvalue explained by factor explained by factors
Factor1 2.36 0.51 0.51
Factor2 2.04 0.44 0.96
Factor3 0.15 0.03 0.99
Factor4 0.06 0.01 1.00
Factor5 0.00 0.00 1.00
Factor6 0.00 0.00 1.00
Likelihood ratio test of independence vs. saturation:  chi2(15) = 0.00002; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Trade; N=14820; retained factors=2
Percentage of variation  Cumulative variation
Eigenvalue explained by factor explained by factors
Factor1 1.98 0.91 0.91
Factor2 0.37 0.17 1.07
Factor3 -0.01 0.00 1.07
Factor4 -0.15 -0.07 1.00
Likelihood ratio test of independence vs. saturation:  chi2(15) = 0.00045; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Policy; N=14820; retained factors=3
Percentage of variation  Cumulative variation
Eigenvalue explained by factor explained by factors
Factor1 2.61 0.81 0.81
Factor2 0.65 0.20 1.02
Factor3 0.16 0.05 1.06
Factor4 -0.02 -0.01 1.06
Factor5 -0.18 -0.06 1.00
Likelihood ratio test of independence vs. saturation:  chi2(15) = 0.00042; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Wartime events; N=14820; retained factors=1
Percentage of variation  Cumulative variation
Eigenvalue explained by factor explained by factors
Factor1 0.17 4.64 4.64
Factor2 -0.04 -1.09 3.54
Factor3 -0.09 -2.54 1.00
Likelihood ratio test of independence vs. saturation:  chi2(3) = 280.85; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000







Dependent variable: average price dispersion
Coefficient Std. Err. p-value
Lagged value 0.405402 0.063570 0.00
Distance 0.015832 0.002993 0.00
Density 0.033933 0.008054 0.00
Adjacency -0.003536 0.001147 0.01
Coast 0.005621 0.002197 0.02
Weather 0.003477 0.002766 0.23
Trade 0.008035 0.002301 0.00
Policy -0.003273 0.003416 0.35




NB: Fixed effects suppressed; OLS estimation with heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation 
consistent standard errors clustered on years.
0.861
0.040
Table 7: Final Estimates with Principal Factors as Regressors
OLS
(county fixed effects)
14820